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THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
INTERNATIONALLY, FOR ACTS OF THE
STATES.'
Should one of our States, by its act or default, offend either a
sister State or a foreign power, and a definite legal obligation be
thereby created, a remedy is offered by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, through an ordinary civil action. The
offended power may sue the offending power in the Supreme
Court of the United States, and justice may be enforced through
the process of that tribunal, in precisely the same manner as if
the defendant were a private individual.
A suit can now be brought against a State by a citizen of
another State or country only by the defendant's consent, since
it has, in this respect the ordinary immunity of a sovereign.
Some States have enacted general laws constituting a tribunal
with jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate demands against the
public treasury; and in all a sufficient remedy for any wrongful
act done under claim of public authority is often afforded by an
action against the officer who committed it, sued as an individual
trespasser, with no reference to his official character. He must
then justify under some law or public mandate, and the validity
of this justification it will be for the court to determine.
But if no definite legal obligation has been created by the act
or default of a State, of which complaint is made, there can in
no case be any judicial remedy, whether in favor of another
power or of a private individual. Wrong may have been done,
but the question of redress becomes merely a political one.
In the preparation of this notice free use has been made of a paper by
the author-" de ]a responsabilit6 du pouvoir f6d6ral aux 1&tats-Unis au cas
ofi les 21tats particuliers s'abstiennent de r(primer les d6lits commis sur leur
territoire "-which appeared in the Revue du Droit fiubhic et de la Science
fiolitique en France et i i' tranger, for Nov. -Dec., 1395.
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If the complaint comes from another power, the injury to the
offended sovereign may be of the kind just considered, that is, to
him only because it is an injury to one of those whom he is
bound to protect, and the individual so injured may often find an
adequate. remedy by a private action against the particular officer
or citizen of the offending State who did the wrongful act.
Such a suit, whether by a citizen of another State or by a for-
eigner, may be brought in the courts of the United States, and
the defendant could not justify under any authority from his own
sovereign, which was in derogation of the plaintiff's rights.
But if the injury to the offended sovereign be one of a polit-
ical character, or one which camot be made good by money, or
if it be one which he is unwilling to submit to judicial determin-
ation, there can be no relief except through the voluntary con-
cession of the State, or the intervention of the United States,
acting through their executive or legislative authorities.
So far as the enforcement of contracts of any sort, executory
or executed, is concerned, the United States are under no other
obligation than that of affording the creditor, if a sovereign
power, a remedy in their courts, by an ordinary civil action;
and should he recover judgment, its collection would depend on
the amount of the property of the State which was subject to
judicial sequestration.
Each State, being a political and corporate unit, binds itself
only by its contracts. Those who choose to trust it do so upon
its own credit.
But the positive, wrongful acts of a State, other than defaults
of contract obligations, stand on ground wholly different. So far
as they affect another State, or its citizens, they often call justly
for redress at the hands of the general government.
If the citizen of one State is denied in another the same com-
mercial privileges or immunities which it concedes to its own
citizens, the courts of the United States stand ready to vindicate
his right.
If, to take a case of a more general character, one of the
States should, in the absence of due authority from the President
of the United States, march a body of its armed militia into or
across a neighboring State without asking and obtaining its
assent, adequate redress (other than by forcible resistance) could
only be obtained by appropriate legislation at the hands of Con-
gress. The United States, by their Constitution, are to guaranty
to each State a republican form of government; and a republic,
which can be invaded by armed troops without its own consent,
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is a republic no longer. Congress, it would seem, could there-
fore make such acts an offense against the United States, to be
repressed by the strong hand, or punished by jucicial sentence.
That comity and equality of right and interest which exists
between the States of the Union has generally been found suffi-
cient to prevent the occurrence of such political difficulties or
misunderstandings. But with respect to foreign powers, the cir-
cumstances are obviously different.
Let us examine some of the instances in which international
questions have arisen from the act or default of a State.
Some sixty years ago an insurrection in Canada was supported
by supplies received from ports on the New York side of Lake
Ontario. The Canadian authorities undertook to seize the Caro-
line, an American vessel engaged in this illicit trade, within the
territorial jurisdiction of New York. An engagement ensued, in
which an American was killed. A Canadian, named McLeod, was
indicted by the grand jury in a State court of New York for the
homicide, on a charge of murder. Not long afterwards he
incautiously ventured across the border and was placed under
arrest. The British Government, which had ratified the expedi-
tion of the Canadian authorities, instructed their minister at
Washington to demand his release. While the Department of
State at first denied any responsibility in the matter, and then
temporized, the President used every endeavor to secure the
prisoner's discharge by the voluntary action of the State author-
ities. They declined to interfere with the ordinary course of
judicial administration. A citizen of New York had been killed
and it was for the State of New York to punish such an infrac-
tion of public order. If there was a defense on the ground of
military orders, let it be made at the trial.
Such an attitude on the part of the State put the United
States in a most disagreeable position. They represented to the
British minister that under American law, all ordinary criminal
jurisdiction belonged to the States, and that the statutes of the
United States conferred upon its officials no power to coerce a
State to discharge a prisoner under indictment. This was true,
but it naturally proved unsatisfactory to the British government.
They had no relations with the State of New York. They had
relations with the United States, and it was from them that they
demanded McLeod's release. No other course was open to them.
-See Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540,
573, 577-
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They were represented in the United States only by a minister,
accredited to the United States, and the Constitutional prohibi-
tion against all agreements between any State and a foreign
power, impliedly excludes all diplomatic negotiations which might
be directed towards securing such an agreement.
An attempt was made to secure McLeod's discharge upon
habeas corpus proceedings in the State courts, but it was unsuc-
cessful.'
This decision was not received with satisfaction by the bar of
the Union.' There can be no doubt that a private soldier is not
liable to indictment for an act of war, performed by the order of
his military superiors. The attack on the Caroline might have
been an unjustifiable invasion of the territory of the United
States, but when the British government assumed the respon-
sibility for it, it became an international matter, too large to
be settled or to be dealt jvith by proceedings of a criminal
nature before a State tribunal.
During the progress of the cause, Daniel Webster succeeded
Mr. Forsyth as Secretary of State, and in instructing the Att or-
ney General to aid in the defense, acknowledged explicitly the
justice of the British claims. "All that is intended to be said, at
present," he wrote, "is that since the attack on the Caroline is
avowed as a national act, which may justifiy reprisals, or even
general war, if the government of the United States, in the judg-
ment which it shall form of the transaction and of its own duty,
should see fit so to decide, yet that it raises a question entirely
public and political; a question between independent nations,
and that individuals concerned in it cannot be arrested and tried
before the ordinary tribunals, as for the violation of municipal
law. If the attack on the Caroline was unjustifiable, as this
government has asserted, the law which has been violated is the
law of nations, and the redress which is to be sought is the redress
authorized, in such cases, by the provisions of that code.
"You are well aware that the President has no power to arrest
the proceeding in the civil and criminal courts of the State of
New York. If this indictment were pending in one of the courts
3 McLeod's Case, 25 Wend. 482; i Hill, 377; 37 Am. Dec. 328.
4 See the criticisms of Judge Talmadge, 26 Wrend. 663, and reply to
these, 3 Hill, 635. Mr. Webster, in I846, referred to the opinion of the
Court, during a debate in the Senate of the United State, as not a "respecta-
ble" one, either in its reasoning or its conclusions. Lord Lyndhurst inclined
to a different view, if we can judge from an informal expression of opinion
quoted from Greville's Memoirs, 3 Whart., Int. Law Dig. 321.
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of the United States, I am directed to say that the President,
upon the receipt of Mr. Fox's last communication, would have
immediately directed a nolleprosequi to be entered.
"It is understood that McLeod is holden also on civil process,
sued out against him by the owner of the Caroline. We suppose
it very clear that the Executive of the State can not interfere
with such process, and, indeed, if such process were pending in
the courts of the United States, the President could not arrest
it. In such, and many analogous cases, the party prosecuted or
sued must avail himself of his exemption or defense by judicial
proceedings, either in the court into which he is called or in
some other court. But whether the process be criminal or civil,
the fact of having acted under public authority and in obedience
to the orders of lawful superiors, must be regarded as a valid
defense; otherwise individuals would be holden responsible for
injuries resulting from the acts of Government, and even from
the operations of public war."'
The trial of McLeod for murder at last came on. At the request
of the Governor of New York, the Chief Justice of the State
presided. The United States virtually assumed his defense, and
both the District Attorney and the Attorney General were pres-
ent during the proceedings. England had sent over additional
troops to Canada and it was well understood that the most seri-
ous consequences might follow in case of his conviction. The
Attorney General had been specially instructed in that event to
sue out a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United
States. Much to the relief of the government, however, McLeod
was acquitted on the plea of an alibi. The Secretary of State
then urged upon Congress the passage of a statute giving the
Judges of the courts of the United States power to discharge by
writ of habeas corpus prisoners held under State authqrity, in con-
travention of the laws or international obligations of the general
government. Such an act was promptly passed and is still on
our statute books (Aug. 29, 1842, 5 U. S. Stat. at Large, 539; Rev.
Stat. sec. 753).
Another instance of the interposition of the United States, to
occupy what would otherwise be part of the domain of the
State Governments in order the better to meet their international
responsibilities, is afforded by the Acts of Congress of 1884 and
189i, in regard to the counterfeiting of securities of foreign gov-
Webster's "Diplomatic and Official Papers," 135.
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ernments (23 Stat. at Large, 22; 26 Stat. at Large, 742). Some years
ago it was discovered that the country was becoming the seat of
extensive forgeries of that nature. This was a matter of little
concern to the several States. They were under no international
obligation to interpose. It was otherwise with the general gov-
ernment. The golden rule is a proper canon of international law
for nations which may choose to adopt it. Congress enacted a
law, making such forgeries highly penal. A prosecution was
brought against one Arjona, for its violation. His counsel
argued that such legislation transcended the powers of Con-
gress, because it could legitimately be had at the hands of the
State, in which the forgery was-committed. The case came, on
appeal, before the Supreme Court of the United States, and it
was there held that whether the State had or had not made the act
penal, Congress could. If the treasury notes of the United States
were being counterfeited, in a country with which they had dip-
lomatic relations, they could reasonably treat it as an unfriendly
act, if, on calling the matter to the attention of the government,
it was not repressed. "But," said the Court, "if the United
States can require this of another, that other may require it of
them, because international obligations are of necessity recipro-
cal in their nature. The right, if it exists at all, is given by the
law of nations, and what is law for one is, under the same cir-
cumstances, law for the other. A right secured by the law of
nations to a nation, or its people, is one the United States as the
representatives of this nation are bound to protect. Conse-
quently, a law which is necessary and proper to afford this pro-
tection is one that Congress may enact, because it is one that is
needed to carry into execution a power conferred by the Consti-
tution on the Government of the United States exclusively.
There is no authority in the United States to require the passage
and enforcement of such a law by the States. Therefore, the
United States must have the power to pass it and enforce it
themselves, or be unable to perform a duty which they may owe
to another nation, and which the law of nations has imposed on
them as part of their international obligations. This, however,
does not prevent a State from providing for the punishment of
the same thing; for here, as in the case of counterfeiting the
coin of the United States, the act may be an offense against the
authority of a State, as well as that of the United States."'
The New Orleans incident of 1891 has given a new point to
these observations.
6 United States v. Arjona, 120 U. S. 487.
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Mob violence to foreigners is in all countries a frequent cause
of international differences. In most, the government whose
peace was broken is the only government concerned. It was its
business to prevent the disorder. It is its business to answer for
its failure to prevent it, and the consequences which have ensued.
But in the United States it is rare that a riot infringes any of
their laws. It may, if it results in obstructions to commerce
between the States or with foreign countries, or if it is in direct
contempt of the Federal authority. But in the great majority of
cases rioters are only guilty of violating the peace and order of
the State.
Such has been the fact with respect to the attacks made from
time to time in some of the Territories or States of the far
West on Chinese or Italian laborers, and to the assassination of
the Italian prisoners in the jails of New Orleans.
Upon the happening of some of these outrages, however, par-
ticularly in recent years, demands for satisfaction have been
made upon the United States by the government whose subjects
were the sufferers. In each the United States have disclaimed any
responsibility. In several, however, they have made pecuniary
compensation from the national treasury, offered as a gratuity
and received as a right.'
7 On February 3, x896, the President sent a special message to Congress
in reference to the massacre of a number of Italian laborers at Walsenburg,
Colo., in March, T895, which had been brought to his attention by the Italian
ambassador, and recommended an appropriation for their families in these
words: "Without discussing the question of the liability of the United States
for these results, either by reason of treaty obligations or under the general
rules of international law, I venture to urge upon the Congress the propriety
of making from the public Treasury prompt and reasonable pecuniary provi-
sion for those injured and for the families of those who were killed." He also
transmitted a copy of a letter on the subject to him from the Secretary of State,
in which Mr. Olney uses this language: "The facts are without dispute, and no
comment or argument can add to the force of their appeal to the generous con-
sideration of Congress. Three persons were killed outright, while two others
sustained injuries of a character the most disabling as well as painful. The
only question would seem to be as to the amount of the gratuity in each case,
which must rest, of course, wholly in the discretion of Congress, to whom it
can hardly be necessary to cite the statutes of many States of the Union fixing
the maximum to be exacted in the case of a death caused by negligence at
the sum of $5,000."
The message also showed that the President had requested the Governor
of Colorado (A. W. Mclntire, Class of 1875, Yale Law School) to endeavor to
procure the summoning of a grand jury from some distant part of the State to
pass upon indictments which were to be presented against some of those
involved in the massacre, but that that had been found impracticable under
the laws of Colorado.
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For such offenses there is often practically no redress in the
States where they are committed. They naturally occur in
communities where social conditions ate new or unsettled; where
might makes right; where there is class feeling and class organ-
ization.
New Orleans is one of the oldest of American cities, but it is
the market of a great stretch of territory, where the capital and
intelligence are in the hands of a few, surrounded by a mass of
ignorant laborers, led often by vicious and unprincipled men.
Society has been there too often kept within bounds by the pis-
tol rather than the jail. It is also in large part a foreign city.
The "French quarter" is as un-American as if it were in the heart
of Paris, or, rather, of the Paris of the days of the first empire.
In 1850 it was the scene of a riot in which the property of a
number of Spaniards was destroyed, in retaliation for the execu-
tion at Havana of several A-mericans who had gone there to aid
the Cubans in a contest for independence. Spain presented a
claim for indemnity against our government. We declined to
recognize its justice, but on the recommendation of the Presi-
dent Congress in 1853 made an appropriation to satisfy it.8
In i89o the cotton handlers at the New Orleans docks struck
for higher wages. The local trades-unions, butchers, bakers,
milkmen and street railway operatives, struck in aid of them.
For two days no street cars ran, no milk was served, no fresh
provisions were on sale. Then a call appeared in the morning
newspapers for a meeting of the Committee of Safety. This, if
the newspaper reports may be trusted, is or was a body of fifty of
the leading citizens, organized for such emergencies, but ordi-
narily dormant. Its deliberations are secret; its actions prompt.
A sub-committee of its members soon called upon the leaders of
the strike and informed them that if it were not called off by six
o'clock on the next morning they would be held "personally
responsible." This is an euphemistic phrase well understood in
that connection at New Orleans. It signifies death. The chair-
man of the sub-committee was the President of one of the largest
concerns in the city. They meant what they said. The strikers
understood them. At six o'clock the next morning the milkmen
were at the door, and the strike was over.
The massacre of the Italians in jail in 1891 was countenanced,
and it might almost be said committed by men of the same high
standing in the community. They justify it by the law of neces-
3 Whart. Int. Law Dig. § 226.
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sity. Perhaps the validity of the plea cannot fairly be judged
by those who live under different social conditions. But, be this
as it may, it is evident that a trial of such men before the courts
of their own States, for a homicide committed under the aus-
pices of the Committee of Safety, would be only a form of declar-
ing their innocence.
It is equally evident that a foreign power, whose subjects had
been the victims of the outrage, and which would be bound to
answer directly to the United States, were an American citizen
killed in an anti-American riot within its territory, would find
it difficult to be contented with the result of any such local prose-
cution. Particularly would this be true, where by treaty it had
agreed with the United States that each should afford due pro-
tection to the persons and property of citizens of the other power,
when within its jurisdiction. The fact that a civil remedy ex-
isted in favor of the heirs of the persons massacred and under
certain conditions could be had in the Federal Courts9 would not
be accepted as offering a sufficient atonement for the wrong.
Public justice would be expected, and, if possible, required.
Considerations of this nature have recently led Congress to
inquire into the practicability and expediency of giving the
Courts of the United States cognizance of crimes of this char-
acter.
Their attention was called to it by President Harrison in his
annual message in December, i89i, in connection with the infor-
mation which he communicated regarding the New Orleans mas-
sacre, and legislation recommended in these words:
"Some suggestions growing out of this unhappy incident are
worthy the attention of Congress. It would, I believe, be en-
tirely competent for Congress to make offenses against the treaty
rights of foreigners domiciled in the United States cognizable in
the Federal Courts. This has not, however, been done, and the
Federal officers and courts have no power in such cases to inter-
vene either for the protection of a foreign citizen or for the pun-
ishment of his slayers. It seems to me to follow, in this state of
the law, that the officers of the State charged with police and
judicial powers in such cases must, in the consideration of inter-
national questions growing out of such incidents, be regarded in
such sense as Federal agents as to make this Government answer-
able for their acts, in cases where it would be answerable, if the
United States had used its constitutional power to define and
punish crimes against treaty rights."
9 Comitez v. Parkerson, 5o Fed. Rep. 170; 56 Fed. Rep. 556.
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The only express grant in the Constitution of power to Con-
gress which could be claimed to cover such an Act as the Presi-
dent suggested, is that (Art I. Sec. 8) as to the definition and
punishment of offenses against the Law of Nations. This would
seem entirely adequate, for that law rests largely upon principles
asserted or recognized by treaties, and considers the infraction
of any engagement of that character as a legitimate cause of war.
A treaty with us also being a law as well as a contract, Con-
gress has the same right to punish all who may offend against
its provisions that it has to punish those who violate statutes of
its own enactment. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 283.
The judicial -power of the United States is declared to extend
to all cases in law and equity arising under their Constitution or
laws, or treaties made by due authority. Already, by act of
Congress, an indictment for murder in a State court can be re-
moved at the will of the defendant, into a court of the United
States for trial, if his defense rests on a claim of authority
derived from the United States. There are certainly strong
grounds for asserting that it is equally within the competency of
Congress to invest those courts with power to adjudge whether
by any act of violence an international or treaty obligation of the
United States has been wrongfully infringed on American soil.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution appears to
lend new support to this position, in its prohibition against the
enactment or enforcement by the States of laws to deprive any
person within their jurisdiction from receiving the equal protec-
tion of their laws. If violence is committed against foreigners,
qua foreigners, in any State, by its authority, the United States
might claim with great force that under this Amendment they
have the power to redress it. But such action-directed against
the enforcement of a State law-would seem to derogate much
more from the sovereignty of the State, than action taken
against individual wrongdoers, who attack foreigners as such,
without law.
Resident or visiting aliens, who are subjects of a friendly
power, so long as they are permitted to remain, may well claim
that they are entitled to the aid of the government within whose
jurisdiction they find themselves, so far as is necessary to the
security of their persons and property, as fully as it is given to
its own citizens. (Cf. U. S. Rev. Stat. Sec. 5299).
The people of the United States in distributing sovereign
power have seen fit to leave to each State the duty of preserving
order within its territory. But they have seen fit also to make
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the government of the United States their sole representative
with respect to all matters of international intercourse and dip-
lomatic negotiation, and to the United States only, therefore,
can a foreign power look for satisfaction, in case of an injury to
its subjects, committed within any State.
An American citizen owes a double allegiance. He is a citizen
of his State as well as of the United States. He can commit
treason against either or both. He is entitled to protection from
each. But if he is molested when traveling abroad by a foreign
power, or by subjects of a foreign power with its connivance or in
consequence of its default, reparation will be demanded by the
United States, and not by the State to which he belongs.
As was said by the court in the Arjona case, above quoted,
the United States have inherent power to defend their interna-
tional obligations, and whatever right they may possess by the
general principles of international law against any other nation,
a similar right that nation possesses against them.
If an American State, upon whose soil wrong is done to a
foreigner, has done what it can, and what international law de-
mands of a sovereign power, to prevent or redress the wrong, the
United States may well repose upon the action thus taken as a
sufficient answer to any diplomatic claims for reparation. But if
such action has not been taken by the State; if its officials
extended no protection, and its tribunals afford no redress, or
afford it only in form, the question beconfes a pertinent one, as
is suggested in President Harrison's message, whether the peo-
ple of the United States, in constituting and bounding their
depositaries of power, have failed to provide for the conse-
quences of such defaults. Have they created themselves a
nation for international purposes, with the power to contract,
but not to discharge international obligations?
The territory of each State is also the territory of the United
States. Each government has a police power, commensurate
with its necessities. That of the United States has been exerted
since the Civil War in many directions which before were
deemed not open to it. By one Act of Congress it has been ex-
tended to the prevention of fraud at State elections, at which
ballots are also cast for persons to hold office under the Constitu-
tion of the United States; by another, to the regulation of every
harbor on the coast. The expediency of legislation of this
description is a matter of Congressional discretion; its validity
has never thus far been successfully disputed.
If the United States are thus asserting national prerogatives
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for the better security of the domestic and internal interests com-
mitted to their charge, may they not with propriety be expected
to proceed in a similar direction for the discharge of their obliga-
tions to foreign powers?
The American Bar Association at three of its recent annual
sessions, made this subject a matter of deliberation; but ulti-
mately declined to make any declaration of opinion as to whether
further legislation by Congress was, or was not desirable."
Among the measures discussed before that body was the draft
of an Act of Congress, in the following form:
"AN ACT
"to enforce treaty provisions for the protection of foreigners
against acts of violence.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States, in Congress assembled:
"Section i. If any act of violence shall be committed within
any State or Territory of the United States against the person or
property of any citizen or subject of a foreign Government,
between which and the United States there exists a treaty at the
time, and such act is one which would constitute a crime or mis-
demeanor at common law, but is not an offense prohibited, or the
punishment whereof is otherwise specially provided for by any
statute of the United States; and if the party committing said
act is not arrested and held for trial within six months after its
commission, under the laws of such State or Territory; then,
should the Minister or other accredited diplomatic representative
of such foreign government complain to the Secretary of State of
the United States, that said act, or the omission to hold for trial
the party committing the same was an infraction of such treaty,
the President of the United States may, if he be of opinion that
there are grounds for such complaint, direct criminal proceed-
ings to be instituted against such party, in the proper Courts of
the United States, holden within said State or Territory.
"Section 2. In any proceeding so instituted by direction of
the President, the act committed by the party accused shall sub-
ject him to the same punishment as that prescribed by the laws
in force at the time of the commission of such act, of such State
or Territory, for such acts; and if said laws prescribe no pun-
ishment therefor, then said act shall be punishable in said pro-
10 Reports of Am. Bar Association, Vols. XIV. 59; XV. 395, 47; XVI.
17, 51, 323.
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ceeding as at common law; and no subsequent repeal of any
such State or Territorial law shall affect any prosecution for
such offense in any Court of the United States.
"Section 3. The institution of such proceedings in a proper
Court of the United States shall operate as a bar to any future
proceedings of a criminal nature against the defendant therein
in any State or Territorial Court."
A statute of such a character as this would appear fully within
the legislative powers of the United States, and in the absence of
a treaty, international obligations might justify provision for sim-
ilar relief.
The Courts of the United States are thrown open to aliens in
civil causes, by the express terms of the Constitution; but since
in our system of judicial procedure, the civil remedy for an act
is kept distinct from the public remedy, it is the more important
that the latter should be promptly and efficiently applied.
The proposed law, in giving the national courts criminal
jurisdiction in case of an injury to aliens of the kind in ques-
tion, would secure an investigation of the affair before a jury not
of the immediate vicinage, and not, therefore, likely to be actu-
ated by neighborly feelings favorable to the accused, acting
under the superintendence of a judge, not responsible to the
State, and who, as he holds office for life, is in an independent
position, as respects local or political influences. The court,
also, being an arm of the government charged with the direc-
tion of all foreign relations, would be measurably within its con-
trol, and its disposition of the accusation might be confidently
asserted by the department of State to be such as comported
with justice and international right. The adoption of the local
laws to define the offense and measure the penalty is in line with
the general policy of the United States in administering judicial
relief concerning matters originating in any particular State.
U. S. Rev. Stat., Sections 72X, 914, 5391, 5512, 5539- In re Coy,
127 U. S. 731, 752.
In his correspondence with the British Minister, as to the
McLeod case, Mr. Webster referred to the probable event of the
prosecution in language which he probably recalled afterwards
with regret that he had not expressed himself with greater
reserve.
"The indictment," he wrote, "is pending in a State court,
but his rights, whatever they may be, are no less safe, it is to be
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presumed, than if he were holden to answer in one of the courts
of this government.
"He demands immunity from personal responsibility by vir-
tue of the law of nations, and that law in civilized States is to be
respected in all courts. None is either so high or so low as to
escape from its authority in cases to which its rules and princi-
ples apply.
"It is understood that the indictment has been removed into
the Supreme Court of the State by the proper proceeding for
that purpose, and that it is now competent for McLeod, by the.
ordinary process of habeas corpus, to bring his case for hearing-
before that tribunal.
"The undersigned hardly needs to assure Mr. Fox that a
tribunal so eminently distinguished for ability and learning as
the Supreme Court of the State of New York may be safely
relied upon for the just and impartial administration of the law
in this as well as in other cases. '"'
In the following year the passage of the new Federal Habeas
Corpus Act having become assured, Mr. Webster was able to
reply with better reason to a renewed complaint from Lord Ash-
burton, then the British minister at Washington, that "the Gov-
ernment of the United States holds itself not only fully respon-
sible but fully competent to carry into practice every principle
which it avows or acknowledges, and to fulfill every duty and
obligation which it owes to foreign governments, their citizens or
subjects. "I'
This pledge made by the executive department more than half
a century ago,it may be fairly doubted if the legislative department
has yet fully redeemed. No other position, however, than that
taken by Mr. Webster comports either with the dignity of the
United States, as one of the great powers of the world, or with
their duties towards other nations, whose subjects are upon our
soil, and claim the protection of our flag.
Sineon E. Baldwin.
1" Webster's Diplomatic and Official Papers, 126.
12 Ibid. 12o; letter of August 6, 1842.
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